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Abstract 
Purpose – The purpose of this paper is to identify key questions that should be addressed to 
enable the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) to provide guidance regarding the alignment 
of anti-money laundering, combating of financing of terror and financial inclusion objectives. 
 
Design/methodology/approach – The paper draws on relevant research and documents of 
the FATF to identify questions that are relevant to consider when it formulates guidance 
regarding the alignment between financial integrity and financial inclusion objectives. 
 
Findings – The FATF advises that its risk-based approach enables countries and institutions 
to further financial inclusion. It is, however, not clear what the FATF means when its uses the 
terms “risk” and “low risk”. It is also unclear whether current proposals for financial 
inclusion regulatory models will necessarily limit money laundering as well as terror 
financing risks to levels that can be described as “low”. The FATF will need to clarify its 
own thinking regarding low money laundering and low terror financing risk before it will be 
able to provide clear guidance to national regulators and financial institutions. 
 
Originality/value – This paper was drafted to inform current FATF discussions regarding 
guidance on financial inclusion. The questions are relevant to all stakeholders in financial 
regulation. 
Keyword(s): 
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1 Introduction 
The Financial Action Task Force (FATF) has agreed to provide greater clarity regarding the 
application of the 40+9 Recommendations, the international anti-money laundering (AML) 
and combating of terrorist financing (CFT) standards, in relation to financial inclusion 
initiatives (Uruttia Corral, 2010). Amendments to the Recommendations and their 
interpretative notes are being discussed as part of the current processes to review the 
Recommendations in preparation for the fourth round of mutual evaluations (FATF, 2010c). 
The FATF has also agreed to develop guidance on AML/CFT and financial inclusion in 
partnership with the Asia/Pacific Group on Money Laundering and the World Bank. 
FATF attention to financial inclusion matters has been long awaited[1]. Countries and 
institutions have struggled to ensure that their AML/CFT controls do not unnecessarily bar 
socially vulnerable persons from accessing formal financial services (Bester et al., 2008; 
World Savings Banks Institute, 2009). The FATF's attention is mainly focused on high-risk 
clients and transactions. Questions relating to financial inclusion initiatives are generally 
linked to low-risk matters and the challenges faced in relation to financial inclusion were 
regarded as peripheral to the FATF's work. However, growing international support for 
financial inclusion, especially the G20 support, brought the matter squarely onto the FATF 
agenda in 2010. 
If the FATF succeeds in skillfully aligning financial inclusion and AML/CFT, the standards 
will provide better support for formalized financial services for millions of additional clients 
who are currently using informal cash-based services. To support financial inclusion, the 
FATF will need to clarify the conditions under which minimal AML/CFT controls can be 
imposed on low-risk products and also provide greater clarity in respect of those cases where 
countries may choose not to apply any AML/CFT controls at all. This will require the FATF 
to consider some of its basic objectives, whether they can be attained with simplified 
AML/CFT controls and whether low-value products should be excluded from these 
objectives. Failure to provide clear and principled guidance may produce an outcome that 
may actually weaken the current standards while still leaving questions that would continue 
to impede financial inclusion initiatives. 
The FATF's task to align AML/CFT and financial inclusion is complicated by the absence of 
reliable money laundering (ML) and financing of terrorism (FT) risk data regarding the 
relevant financial products. The lack of reliable information may lead to an over- or under-
estimation of the risks posed by the relevant products. Guidance based on assumptions rather 
than evidence and appropriate risk assessments may also undermine the more principled and 
fact-based AML/CFT risk assessment approach that the FATF is advocating. 
This paper identifies a number of key matters that should be pondered when the FATF 
considers appropriate ways to align financial integrity and financial inclusion. It is not 
primarily intended to provide answers although the questions that are being put do reflect the 
author's views regarding potential answers and solutions[2]. The most appropriate answers 
for purposes of the FATF processes would, however, be formulated after open and intensive 
evidence-based debate at an international level. Neither is the note intended to summarize all 
the questions that should be posed in this process[3]. In the interests of space and time, this 
paper is deliberately limited to key questions that will support the formulation of principled 
guidance that could align financial inclusion and AML/CFT objectives. 
2 Financial inclusion initiatives 
Financial inclusion, simply defined as providing access to financial services for all (CGAP, 
2009, p. 1), has gained prominence as an international policy initiative to combat poverty 
(Demirgüç-Kunt et al., 2008). Financial inclusion initiatives are primarily aimed at low-
income individuals and micro enterprises. Initially, the objective was to facilitate their access 
to micro credit. The drive expanded, however, to micro savings products and to micro 
insurance. 
Different factors contribute to the current lack of access to financial services (Access 
Through Innovation Subgroup of the G20 Financial Inclusion Experts Group, 2010, p. 9). 
Potential barriers include geography (e.g. limited presence of financial institutions in thinly 
populated rural areas), product design (e.g. high minimum balance requirements or usage 
requirements), costs (e.g. standard fees that are too high for socially vulnerable clients), 
marketing practices (e.g. financial products that are marketed as aimed at wealthy clients), 
language barriers (where forms and marketing materials are not available in the language of 
the socially vulnerable groups) and identification requirements (e.g. processes that require 
potential clients to prove their identity with documents that are not readily available to 
socially vulnerable groups) (Isern and de Koker, 2009). The FATF will need to be mindful of 
barriers such as these because it should not unnecessarily exacerbate existing barriers or 
construct new ones. In addition, it will need to understand some of the realities and 
implications of financial inclusion business models: 
 Successful financial inclusion initiatives will add millions of new financial services 
clients. The client base of financial services providers will expand dramatically. 
While there is space for development of the client base in many developed countries, 
the most spectacular growth will be seen in developing countries. Higher levels of 
financial inclusion will hold many social benefits but will also add to the current 
pressures on regulators and law enforcement agencies in those jurisdictions[4]. 
 Underserved clients are diverse and client groups have different risk profiles. The 
majority of underserved clients are low-income persons. However, in many countries 
factors such as culture and geography resulted in the exclusion of many higher 
income persons too. Underserved groups often include rural communities, women, 
undocumented migrants, prisoners and former prisoners as well as bankrupts. Risk 
profiles of groups and sub-groups of underserved clients may differ widely within a 
country and different country contexts may also lead to similar groups displaying 
different profiles in different jurisdictions. In some jurisdictions, for instance, 
underserved clients are actively involved in crimes such as opium production, illegal 
logging and terrorism. The term “underserved clients” therefore refers to a very 
diverse group of people with very different client risk profiles. As a consequence, 
regulators and institutions cannot simply classify all underserved clients as low-risk 
clients merely because they are financially excluded. On the other hand, appropriate 
risk assessment and customer due diligence (CDD) measures will be required if 
institutions have to differentiate between groups of underserved clients. 
 New providers and new provider relationships are emerging, challenging the 
traditional approaches of policymakers and regulators. New business models, new 
partnerships and new providers are emerging to provide services to the underserved. 
Mobile money initiatives are particularly promising (Chatain et al., 2011). Some of 
these initiatives are led by partnerships between banks and telecommunication service 
providers but in some cases the telecommunications service providers are taking the 
lead role in the provision of these services (Chatain et al., 2008, 2011). The mobile 
money business models rely on small, low-capacity retailers to perform cash-in and 
cash-out functions that would otherwise be performed by more expensive bricks and 
mortar agencies and bank branches. Key role players in these services are therefore 
very different from the traditional providers of financial services. They will require 
appropriate regulation and regulatory resources. Requirements and solutions may 
differ from country to country and model to model. 
 Regulators should not weigh down financial inclusion business models with 
unnecessary compliance costs. There are question marks hanging over the 
profitability of many of the new business models to enhance financial inclusion (with 
M-PESA in Kenya as one of the notable exceptions). Financial inclusion clients are 
extremely cost sensitive and business models are less able to allow costs to flow 
through to clients. Compliance costs are a significant cost factor for service providers 
and regulation that imposes unnecessarily high compliance costs may render key 
business models unviable. Regulators must therefore take great care when they design 
appropriate compliance obligations for these providers. Ideally, such obligations 
should be restricted to the essential. When determining what is essential, regulators 
should, however, be careful not to sacrifice the integrity of the services or the 
protection of the clients in order to ensure broader coverage. 
 Many financial inclusion business models will rely on technology and indirect and 
non-face-to-face client interaction. The need for affordability and geographical reach 
will lead many providers to rely on technology and non-face-to-face transactions. 
Mobile phones, the internet and ATMs will feature prominently in these models. 
Retailers as agents, independent contractors and third parties, both for cash-in and 
cash-out functions, as well as client take-on and account opening procedures, will 
play a key role in major models. 
 Restricted, no frills financial products are developed for financially excluded clients, 
but there is a need for access to additional products too. A number of countries 
balance AML/CFT and financial inclusion objectives by allowing simplified CDD 
measures in relation to products that are subject to stringent usage restrictions, for 
instance, transactional restrictions (e.g. capping the value of transactions that may be 
conducted daily or by excluding cross-border transactions or functionality) or balance 
restrictions (e.g. that the balance in an account may not exceed a stated amount). 
Restricted financial products serve basic needs but the needs of the underbanked are 
diverse. Occasionally, there may be a need to transact outside such restrictions, 
especially in cases of emergency, for example, when a family member dies or when 
an extraordinary payment is due, for instance, after a workplace injury. AML/CFT 
barriers that were removed in respect of basic products, may be encountered by such 
users when they need to access unrestricted products. Restrictions also impact on the 
attractiveness of the product from both a service provider and a client perspective[5]. 
 Innovative developments will take place in low-capacity countries. Many innovative 
developments will take place in low-capacity countries. These countries have a 
limited ability to enable cheap and secure means for residents to verify their identities. 
Their regulators also have limited capacity and this capacity will be further stretched 
by the new developments. 
 Discussions regarding regulatory frameworks for financial inclusion business models 
are currently not informed by reliable data regarding the ML/FT risk profiles of 
different models. Numerous financial inclusion models are being piloted around the 
globe. Most are functioning within regulatory frameworks that were shaped around 
their low-risk profiles. However, very little data about the financial integrity of these 
models have yet been gathered[6]. Key data about actual forms and levels of criminal 
abuse of these products that could have informed the FATF's financial inclusion 
deliberations are therefore not available. Evidence that is available, is of doubtful 
quality. It is mostly anecdotal or limited in time, range and context[7]. In a number of 
cases, regulators and businesses have provided information that is not complete or 
reflective of reality. Interesting ideas and models have therefore been proposed or 
implemented, but whether they succeed in balancing access and integrity successfully, 
has not yet been proved conclusively. Best practice approaches that have been tried 
and tested and have shown themselves to balance financial inclusion and AML/CFT 
successfully, have therefore not emerged yet. 
3 Questions that should be considered when FATF standards are clarified 
The brief summary of some of the implications and realities of financial inclusion business 
models above highlights a few of the aspects that will need to be considered by the FATF 
(2010a, pp. 66-71). However, it is important that the FATF also turns its attention to its own 
framework and principles. Solutions to financial inclusion challenges will need to be 
grounded upon the FATF's own principles otherwise they may undermine the broader 
AML/CFT framework. Some of these principles are not clearly expressed and members may 
hold different views on their interpretation and application. Consensus regarding more 
fundamental matters will, however, support a constructive and intellectually honest 
engagement of the financial inclusion challenges. 
It is submitted that the following questions should be answered to ensure a constructive 
discussion: 
 Is AML/CFT primarily geared to preserving the financial integrity of formal financial 
services? 
 Is AML/CFT primarily exclusionary or inclusionary? 
 What is meant by CDD in an era of modern mass provision of financial services in 
high- and low-capacity countries? 
 Is it valid to view account-based financial products as more vulnerable to ML/FT 
abuse than occasional (non-account-based) transactions? 
 What is the definition of “risk”, “high(er) risk” and “low(er) risk” for purposes of a 
risk-based approach to AML/CFT? 
 What are appropriate controls to impose on financial inclusion products? 
The discussion that follows does not propose to answer these questions but attempts to 
explain why the question is relevant[8]. 
3.1 Is AML/CFT primarily geared to preserving the integrity of formal financial services? 
The impact of AML/CFT on the ability of socially vulnerable people to access financial 
services has been under discussion for many years. Various countries (the UK, the USA, 
South Africa, etc.) experimented with simplified client identification and verification 
measures, but there was no clear indication whether their solutions met the FATF standards 
(Bester et al., 2008). In a number of conference discussions, concerns were raised that these 
simplified measures eroded the quality of AML/CFT controls by providing criminals with 
backdoors into formal financial services[9]. 
In 2005, a study was launched to consider the impact of AML/CFT in five developing 
countries. The draft report was circulated in 2007 to the FATF, the Basel Committee on 
Banking Supervision, and various FATF-style regional bodies. The report was finally 
published in 2008 (Bester et al., 2008). The authors of the report defused the erosion 
argument by arguing that financial inclusion and financial integrity are complementary policy 
objectives (Bester et al., 2008, p. vi): 
The pursuit of financial inclusion and the pursuit of an effective AML/CFT regime are 
complementary and not conflicting financial sector policy objectives. The objective with 
financial inclusion is that individual clients, particularly low-income clients currently 
excluded from using formal financial services, must be able to access and on a sustainable 
basis use financial services that are appropriate to their needs and provided by registered 
financial service providers. Without a sufficient measure of financial inclusion, a country's 
AML/CFT system will thus safeguard the integrity of only a part of its financial system – the 
formally registered part – leaving the informal and unregistered components vulnerable to 
abuse. Measures that ensure that more clients use formal financial services therefore increase 
the reach and effectiveness of the AML/CFT controls. 
This argument resonated with the 2009-2010 President of the FATF, Paul Vlaanderen. In an 
address to the ESAAMLG Ministers at a meeting in Lesotho in August 2009, he stated the 
following (Vlaanderen, 2009): 
I do believe that the pursuit of financial inclusion and the pursuit of an effective AML/CFT 
regime are complementary; they are by no means conflicting financial sector policy 
objectives. Without a sufficient degree of financial inclusion, a country's AML/CFT system 
will safeguard the integrity of only a part of its financial system – the formally registered part 
– leaving the informal and unregistered components vulnerable to abuse. Measures that 
ensure that more clients use formal financial services therefore enlarges the legitimate 
financial sector. A robust financial sector, including effective AML/CFT controls, are 
important ingredients for aspiring members of the global financial community[10]. 
The complementarity argument speaks to the absurdity of a narrow AML/CFT focus in 
countries with low levels of financial inclusion. For example, if Tanzania has an effective 
AML/CFT system in respect of the banking sector, the system can impact on the integrity of 
transactions of the 9 percent of the population with bank accounts[11]. It will fail, however, 
to safeguard the integrity the transactions of the vast majority of Tanzanians who can only 
transact informally[12]. 
This argument, however, assumes that the FATF concerns itself with financial integrity in the 
economy as a whole. FATF's initial 1989 brief was more limited. It was tasked with 
identifying measures to safeguard the banking sector and bureaux de change against abuse. 
This brief quickly broadened to financial institutions and later to designated non-financial 
businesses and professions. Although some of its Recommendations and work range 
broader[13], FATF has not yet explicitly adopted a brief encompassing the economy as a 
whole. 
If the FATF does acknowledge such a wider brief, it also needs to consider the implications 
of such a brief. It may require the drafting of additional Recommendations or at least 
amendments to its current Recommendations to ensure that the FATF addresses in greater 
detail all institutions in the formal economy that are vulnerable to ML/FT abuse. The FATF 
will also need to address integrity concerns relating to the informal and cash economy. It is 
submitted that such a brief will necessitate standards regarding government policy in relation 
to informal economic activity, the quality of a country's financial inclusion policy, its policy 
on regulation and regulatory scope as well as regulatory capacity building and its efforts to 
improve the ability of citizens to prove their identities. These matters will not be merely 
peripheral but part of the core standards and actions to mitigate ML/FT risk in the economy 
as a whole. These matters will also be investigated during mutual evaluations and elicit a 
compliance rating. 
Government action that may actually grow the cash economy will also need to be considered. 
This would include bureaucratic red tape that may prevent registration and formalization of 
informal businesses, tax and tax enforcement policies that incentivizes informality and also 
the issuing of high-denomination banknotes. Such notes lend themselves to ML abuse. They 
enable criminals to transact informally and to convey large cash amounts with ease. The 
issuing of high-denomination notes is currently addressed by Recommendation 20 but the 
FATF has not been particularly vocal about this abuse. In this regard, the EUR 500 note is 
particularly problematic. According to a recent Citibank report 570 million EUR 500 notes to 
the value of EUR 285 billion are in circulation. They account in value for 35 percent of all 
Euro notes. The value of the EUR 500 notes in circulation grew by 32 percent per year since 
they were first issued in 2002[14]. In 1999, the FATF voiced concern about the then 
proposed EUR 500 note (FATF, 1999, para. 18) but these concerns were ignored. Evidence 
has since emerged that the EUR 500 note is a note of choice for bulk cash smugglers[15]. 
If the FATF fails to take action on matters such as these, it will not only be failing to act in 
accordance with the broader brief, but will also provide space for the abuse of the 
complementarity argument: the argument allows a country to implement simplified 
AML/CFT controls to facilitate access to the formal economy in order to counter the criminal 
abuse of the informal sector of its economy. If the country is not required to take active steps 
to formalize the informal sector, the simplified measures can become entrenched[16]. If the 
country actively or passively grows its informal economy, it may even argue for a further 
relaxation of AML/CFT controls given the increased threat posed by the larger informal 
economy. Failure to ensure that countries address the drivers of informal economic activity, 
may therefore gradually undermine the general AML/CFT scheme. 
3.2 Is AML/CFT primarily exclusionary or inclusionary? 
Is the primary objective of AML/CFT to keep criminal money out of regulated financial 
services or to have criminal money flows observed and reported? This question is closely 
linked to the one above. 
Regulators, for instance, generally regard it as a primary duty to keep dirty money out of the 
sector that they regulate. Intelligence agencies, on the other hand, would rather want 
regulated institutions to take on criminal clients, identify them as such through appropriate 
CDD measures and report their suspicious activities to the authorities. 
If AML is aimed at keeping criminals out, the purpose of CDD would be to identify 
undesirable clients to ensure that they are denied services. This is, for instance, the purpose of 
sanction schemes, for instance, those relating to terrorist financing. 
If the aim is to include as many clients as possible to monitor their financial transactions, 
CDD should be aimed at identifying and profiling clients. Profiling information supports 
effective transaction monitoring. 
When this question is settled, it is important to consider the impact of the answer. If 
AML/CFT is primarily inclusive, client profiling should feature more prominently in 
simplified CDD measures[17]. The alignment between the inclusivity of the standards and 
the exclusivity of the international terrorist financing sanctions regime should also be 
considered and addressed. The FATF should furthermore consider how this message is 
relayed to financial institutions and how they are incentivized to take on higher risk clients to 
support the FATF's broader crime intelligence gathering objectives. 
If AML/CFT is primarily exclusive, financial institutions will tend to exclude criminal clients 
as well as honest clients who are not able to prove their credentials. This will especially 
happen where the risk mitigation measures in relation to such clients are not justified by the 
fees that can be raised when they are retained as clients. Such exclusion will undermine 
financial inclusion initiatives and of course also the ability of the AML/CFT system to 
generate crime-combating intelligence. 
3.3 What is meant by CDD in an era of modern mass provision of financial services in 
high- and low-capacity countries? 
The FATF's CDD standards (often referred to as “Know Your Client” or “KYC” measures) 
reflect a somewhat quaint, developed country, banking-centric view of client relationships 
that is at odds with the reality of modern mass financial services. 
The CDD principles and the related “KYC” language reflect an era of banking where bankers 
and clients had personal relationships, where accounts were only opened after introductions 
and interviews and where transactions were primarily processed by persons who knew the 
client and could be struck by patterns of transactions that are at odds with their knowledge of 
the client. By 1990, when the FATF adopted its original Recommendations, banking practice 
had already moved into the mass marketing and mass processing era. Society had also 
developed and changed. Clients in developed countries are generally time poor and have little 
desire to meet and spend time with representatives of their banks. Clients value their personal 
time and prefer to interact and communicate with banks through non-face-to-face methods. 
ATMs, internet banking, mobile banking and other forms of branchless banking provide 
clients with more convenient and impersonal ways of interacting with the banks. Banks 
support these developments as non-face-to-face service delivery is cheaper and more 
profitable. While an element of client interaction and actual client knowledge is still retained 
in high-value private banking, it is certainly not part of the majority of modern financial 
relationships. 
Although the term “KYC” is used in relation to AML/CFT-related CDD, this phrase often 
refers in practice to little more than a bureaucratic collection of standard information relating 
to the client, some level of verification of the information provided and either manual 
monitoring of some transactions through sampling or electronic scanning of all transactions 
against set parameters. These parameters are not necessarily particularly effective at 
identifying transactions involving proceeds of crime[18], but electronic scanning is the most 
appropriate method to be employed in relation to the millions of transactions that a large 
modern provider of financial services processes daily. The identification and verification of 
clients is a key element of CDD. Yet, as is argued in Section 3.6.2, it is generally realized that 
these processes are generally bureaucratic in nature and their efficacy can be questioned. 
Given the general challenges and flaws of CDD in practice, what are the objectives these 
processes can and should attain? What is the function of CDD in a low-capacity country that 
tries to extend financial services to residents whose names are not captured on a 
comprehensive national identity base, whose births may or may not have been registered and 
where clients do not possess reliable documents to verify their identities easily and securely? 
What purpose is served by simplified CDD in those circumstances, where the process may 
not be able to deliver much in terms of information or reliability? Should the standard CDD 
process in these circumstances merely be simplified or should it be re-designed or even 
substituted? Simplification may simply erode the already limited effectiveness of the 
processes[19] and alternative processes that are introduced, may hold unintended 
consequences. Where regulations were amended to allow those who do not have formal proof 
of their personal particulars to present letters of affirmation drafted by their employers, it 
increased the power and hold of employers over vulnerable employees. In some cases where 
village chiefs were allowed to draft such letters, the chiefs started to demand money for these 
“verification services”. As a consequence, low-income persons in these communities face an 
additional financial barrier if they wish to access formal financial services. In these cases, the 
AML/CFT solution may open space for corrupt practices and the abuse of power while the 
verification “fees” introduce a new financial barrier that may undermine financial inclusion. 
In addition, the actual verification value of such letters of verification should be considered 
with care. The level of authentication that they afford depends heavily on the actual 
knowledge and integrity of the person who verifies the particular facts and it is very difficult 
for financial institutions to determine whether the verifier is reliable and is acting with 
integrity. In many cases such letters simply serve to produce a document that meets the 
regulator's requirement for a piece of paper but does little to advance authentication. 
3.4 Is it valid to treat low-value account-based financial products as more vulnerable to 
ML/FT abuse than occasional (non-account-based) transactions? 
The FATF differentiates between CDD measures in relation to account-based products and 
those in relation to occasional (non-account-based) transactions, such as occasional money 
transfers and many prepaid cards. Recommendation 5 states that no financial institutions 
should keep anonymous accounts or accounts in obviously fictitious names. Identification 
and verification measures must therefore be taken in respect of account-based products, 
irrespective of the value concerned. Occasional transactions, on the other hand, are treated 
differently. Customers only need to be identified and their particulars verified if the value of 
the transaction exceeds USD/EUR 15,000 or, in the case of wire transfers, USD/EUR 1,000. 
This exemption is set out in the Recommendations and countries do not need to argue and 
prove that they pose a lower risk to justify the exclusion of these transactions from the 
standard FATF CDD controls. 
It is submitted that such a distinction undermines a principled risk-based approach in relation 
to financial inclusion products. USD/EUR 15,000 is a vast sum from the perspective of low-
income persons. The majority of low-value financial inclusion accounts that are targeted at 
the unbanked will not have an amount of USD/EUR 15,000 flowing through them during the 
duration of the account. However, in terms of the current scheme of the Recommendations, 
such accounts must be subjected to appropriate controls and cannot be opened anonymously, 
unless such an exemption can be justified on the basis of risk. Occasional transactions under 
the USD/EUR 15,000 limit often present a far higher risk but are automatically exempted by 
the FATF scheme. This is inconsistent from a risk-based perspective. 
The distinction between account-based and non-account-based products is probably both 
historical and practical in nature. One of the key aims of the original Recommendations was 
to remove bank secrecy and to ban anonymous accounts. This may explain the stricter 
approach to account-based products. Pragmatically, extensive due diligence is less feasible in 
relation to occasional transactions. Clients may not readily have verification documentation 
on their person when they wish to conclude a once-off transaction. Monitoring is also of less 
value because most institutions will only transact once with a particular client. The lack of a 
pattern of transactions will undermine the effectiveness of any monitoring that might have 
been required. 
While these reasons are understandable, it is submitted that this distinction must be 
reconsidered in view of the FATF's risk-based approach. In terms of a principled risk-based 
approach products that share the same risk profiles should be treated similarly, where 
feasible. Low-value account-based products and low-value occasional transactions should 
therefore benefit from similar exemptions where their risk profile is similar. 
3.5 What is the definition of “risk”, “high(er) risk” and “low(er) risk” for purposes of a 
risk-based approach to AML/CFT? 
Many AML/CFT solutions to the financial inclusion challenges lie in a risk-based approach. 
The implications of this approach are emerging gradually as the FATF's own thinking about 
the risk-based approach develops and matures. 
In 2003, the FATF introduced risk as an element that may shape specific elements of national 
regulation and the design of institutional controls. The FATF was cautious when it introduced 
the approach. There were fears that countries may abuse risk arguments to evade compliance 
with the Recommendations. As a result, the approach was limited to specific aspects of the 
Recommendations. In addition, the FATF determined that some aspects must be treated as 
creating a higher risk. 
After an initial period of uncertainty about the risk-based approach, various guidance papers 
and reports on the implementation of the risk-based approach were issued (FATF, 2007). The 
guidance is helpful but their value is limited by a lack of conceptual clarity regarding the 
meaning of “risk”. In 2010, the FATF acknowledged in its global risk assessment document 
that the meaning of these terms has not yet been settled in respect of AML/CFT (FATF, 
2010a, p. 13): 
The terms risk, threat and vulnerability are often used by the FATF when describing how 
jurisdictions should implement AML/CFT standards. For example, the FATF has published a 
number of documents which address the concept of ML/TF risk. However, there is currently 
no standard or universal definition for these terms. 
The FATF documents therefore set out processes to be followed as well as lists of indicators 
of high and low risk, without defining what is meant by “low risk” and “high risk”. 
In the past, the FATF appeared to believe that its framework is sufficiently clear to enable 
regulators of developing countries to adopt simplified CDD measures in relation to low risk, 
low-value transactions. Mr Paul Vlaanderen, the FATF President for 2009-2010, for example, 
remarked as follows (Vlaanderen, 2009): 
The 40 plus 9 FATF Recommendations were designed with some degree of flexibility to 
allow developed and developing economies to implement them in a context-sensitive manner. 
However, the last few years show that developing countries have not always used this 
flexibility and simply fashioned their AML/CFT frameworks on the models of developed 
countries. 
It is debatable whether the framework is sufficiently clear. Without definitions and 
conceptual clarity, it is very difficult to determine whether a particular model or proposal will 
meet the FATF requirements for low-risk classification. The FATF also underestimated the 
level of caution that its blacklisting and grey listing processes produced, especially for 
regulators and policymakers in low-capacity countries. The fear factor often results in a very 
and conservative interpretation of the FATF standards. In addition, some of the FATF 
statements have added to the uncertainty. For example, the FATF guidance on the risk posed 
by low-value transactions did not guide regulators to classify low-value transactions as low-
risk transactions (FATF, 2007; De Koker, 2009b): 
It should be noted that transactions associated with the financing of terrorists may be 
conducted in very small amounts, which in applying a risk-based approach could be the very 
transactions that are frequently considered to be of minimal risk with regard to money 
laundering. 
Although the statement is quite correct, it creates a regulatory quandary. Regulators must be 
mindful of both ML and FT risk when they design regulatory frameworks. If the FATF 
informs them that low-value transaction may (“could”) pose a minimal ML risk, but not 
necessarily a minimal FT risk, a cautious regulator will not treat these transactions as posing 
a low (combined) ML/FT risk. 
FATF representatives have also referred to countries that provide examples of simplified 
CDD that may be considered by other countries. South African regulations feature 
prominently in FATF presentations as an example of steps that can be taken. Yet, the FATF's 
2008 Mutual Evaluation Report of South Africa discussed its simplified CDD regime, without 
endorsing it explicitly. Elements of its simplified CDD regime were actually criticized as 
eroding record-keeping in relation to client identification and verification. In general, South 
Africa's broad CDD and record-keeping requirements were rated as partially compliant with 
the FATF Recommendations (CGAP, 2010, p. 10). This is not a particularly strong official 
endorsement of the South African model. The tension between the official FATF rating of its 
financial inclusion model and the oral endorsement of this model by FATF representatives 
feeds regulatory uncertainty. 
It seems as if the FATF has grown increasingly sensitive to the need for direction and its 
impact on regulators in low-capacity countries. Mr Luis Urrutia Corral, the FATF President 
for 2010-2011, for example, remarked as follows at the XVII Caribbean Financial Action 
Task Force Council of Ministers Meeting in 2010 (Uruttia Corral, 2010): 
Over the years, signals have reached the FATF that the FATF Standard is in some ways an 
impediment to financial inclusion, and perhaps the aforementioned unique enforcement 
structure has encouraged regulators and legislators to follow the FATF standard strictly 
without taking into account the type of customers envisaged by the term “financial 
inclusion”. It is important for FATF to ensure that AML/CFT measures are not an 
impediment to the supply of financial services to the low-income sector. 
It is submitted that the FATF can achieve this objective by adopting appropriate definitions 
and being more principled, clear and consistent in its guidance. This in turn will assist 
national regulators to act with greater confidence. 
3.6 What are appropriate controls to impose on financial inclusion products? 
AML/CFT and financial inclusion experts agree that AML/CFT controls for financial 
inclusion products must be sensible. The financial services industry appears to be lobbying 
for tiered or progressive identification and verification processes that would allow for the 
following (Solin and Zerzan, 2009; World Savings Banks Institute, 2009; Alexandre et al., 
2010; Chatain et al., 2011): 
 Basic account-based and occasional transaction products that may be offered 
anonymously (alternatively with client identification but no verification or with 
simplified identification and verification) as long as transaction and balance 
restrictions are imposed to mitigate risks. 
 Higher levels of verification for products with more relaxed transaction and balance 
limits. 
 Due diligence processes in relation to any agents that may be used (referred to as 
“Know Your Agent” or “KYA” processes). 
 Monitoring of transactions to identify suspicious transactions. 
The proposed approach, though sensible, is clearly too general to be effective in relation to all 
financial inclusion models irrespective of where they are employed. For a national regulator, 
therefore, key questions are: 
 Will the proposed approach be effective to support AML/CFT and financial inclusion 
objectives? 
 What is the value that each of the controls would add? 
It is submitted that FATF should considered the following matters when it drafts guidance for 
national regulators: 
 Is there room for anonymous products in the FATF framework? 
 What is the difference between anonymity and identification in the FATF scheme? 
 What are the advantages and disadvantages of a tiered CDD scheme? 
 What do effective KYA measures entail in relation to small, informal retailers? 
 What is the value of transaction monitoring in relation to basic financial products that 
are offered anonymously or in terms of a simplified CDD scheme? 
 How do you prove or demonstrate that unproven new products are low-risk products? 
 What are appropriate controls for financial inclusion products that cannot be rated as 
low risk, but moves users from high-risk informal transactions to formal and more 
controlled financial services? 
 Should AML/CFT measures in relation to financial inclusion products be concerned 
with politically exposed persons (PEPs)? 
 Should the FATF refer to specific minimum amounts in its standards? 
3.6.1 Is there room for anonymous products in the FATF framework? 
The answer to this question is simple: yes. For example, the current FATF framework allows 
services to be provided anonymously in relation to occasional transactions below USD/EUR 
15,000 or wire transfers below USD/EUR 1,000[20]. 
The space for anonymity has also been broadened by members of the FATF. The EU Third 
Money Laundering Directive, for instance, explicitly allows anonymous electronic money 
devices (prepaid cards) where, if the device cannot be recharged, no more than EUR 150 can 
be stored in the device. Where the device can be recharged, a general limit of EUR 2,500 is 
imposed on the total amount transacted in a calendar year, subject to some exceptions[21]. 
The question is therefore not whether the FATF allows some low-value financial inclusion 
products to be offered anonymously but how best to do so in the national environment and 
whether and how the resultant risks could be appropriately mitigated: 
1. What is the value and implications of transaction monitoring in relation to anonymous 
products (Section 3.6.5)? 
2. Are transaction caps the main risk control measure in relation to anonymous products 
and, if so, does that imply that the risk of small CFT transactions and low-level 
corrupt payments can be tolerated[22] (Sections 3.5 and 3.6.8)?  
o If such measures are only allowed in countries with low crime and CFT risk 
levels, how should such levels be determined and what levels will be classified 
as “low” for purposes of an FATF evaluation? 
o Where caps are the main risk control mechanism, what can feasibly be done to 
prevent clients from accessing more than one service from more than one 
service provider? Absence of appropriate controls means that caps can be 
circumvented by criminals simply by opening more than one account. 
3.6.2 What is the difference between anonymity and identification in the FATF scheme? 
As part of its CDD standards, FATF's Recommendation 5 requires institutions to: 
Identify(ing) the customer and verify(ing) that customer's identity using reliable, independent 
source documents, data or information. 
At face value, the requirement seems clear: business must combat ML and TF abuse by 
ensuring that they know the identity of their clients. In practice, however, this objective is 
elusive. Professional criminals are professional at identity fraud too and the identification and 
verification[23] systems of most institutions are just not sufficient and effective to identity 
sophisticated identity fraud, especially when it is not committed to cause financial loss to the 
institution. The quality of the identification and verification measures that an institution can 
implement is restricted by a number of factors, for example: 
1. Costs. It may be effective to research a client's background, but if the transaction is 
small such costs would not be commercially justifiable. 
2. Client resistance. Clients, especially potential clients, are mobile and will move to 
other institutions that are less intrusive or less bureaucratic in their account opening 
procedures. 
3. Laws. Privacy laws may restrict access to relevant information. 
4. Internationalisation of the client base. It is often more difficult to verify identities of 
foreign nationals because they may not be able to present verification documentation 
that is similar or equivalent to those that can be offered by citizens and it is more 
difficult to establish the integrity of such documents. 
5. Consistency of identification particulars [24] . Identifying particulars that an 
institution can gather may not be sufficiently consistent or reliable to support 
structured information management systems (names of clients may be subject to 
change, their addresses may be informal and/or may change often, etc.). 
6. Documents that can be used for verification, may not be highly reliable. 
The last two factors are particularly problematic. The standard particulars that clients must 
furnish to institutions may not actually be of much value to ensure identification. In many 
countries, persons may use different names or may change the spelling of their names 
informally. Not all countries have national identification numbers and the integrity of the data 
of some who has, is tainted by corruption and maladministration. Many addresses may be 
informal and both formal and informal addresses may change frequently. In essence, the 
quality of identification and verification processes relies heavily on an effective public-
private partnership. The state must determine how citizens will be identified and should 
ensure that each resident is able to do so effectively, securely and cheaply. Institutions on the 
other hand, must leverage off the system provided by the state and implement reasonable 
measures to ensure that they know who their clients are. 
The FATF approach seems to lose sight of the relevance of this public-private partnership. 
This is possibly because the Recommendations were initially formulated by countries where 
public identification frameworks are in place and functioning well. As a consequence, the 
FATF focuses on the processes implemented by the institutions without actually considering 
the quality of the outcomes. A client will be therefore be “identified and verified” for 
AML/CFT purposes if the bank collected the client's personal particulars and verified the 
particulars against a government-issued national identity document, where that is available. 
Unfortunately, the quality of government documents in some countries may be problematic 
and the process may therefore fail to deliver a sufficient level of assurance. The FATF 
evaluation teams have, however, not consistently probed the reliability of a country's national 
identity documents. Some of these countries have received positive ratings for ensuring that 
institutions follow the prescribed processes even though the outcomes of those processes are 
of doubtful quality. 
The use of the phrase “identification and verification” to refer to the due diligence processes 
rather than the outcome of the process has blurred the distinction between anonymity and 
identification[25]. A client would not be regarded as identified and verified unless he was 
subjected to the standard processes. As a result, a small financial services provider in a rural 
community who went to school with a client and knows his family well, will generally not be 
regarded as compliant if he does not subject the client to the formal processes. He will, on the 
other hand, be compliant if he subjects a new client to those processes even though the 
processes may not authenticate the client's actual identity. It is submitted that this approach 
should be revisited, especially in the context of financial inclusion products. 
In the AML/CFT context, identification and anonymity as outcomes of the CDD process can 
be viewed as points on a continuum. In between, there are various other possibilities and 
grades of identification and levels of verification[26]. One such possibility is that the client is 
not identified upfront, but is identifiable. In such a case, various other bits of information may 
be triangulated in order to identify a client, when required[27]. For example, a mobile phone 
user may use the phone anonymously, but the phone usage data and patterns may enable law 
enforcement to identify the user. The phone may also act a tracking device enabling law 
enforcement to pinpoint the whereabouts of the user and apprehend the user. Although this 
may be time consuming, it will only be done when required. The current system requires all 
clients to be subjected to verification processes when the vast majority of the clients will 
never be of interest to law enforcement. 
The emphasis on AML/CFT identification processes obscures some of the very real questions 
about the objectives of the processes. The objectives are relevant to the financial inclusion 
discussions because simplified CDD controls should at least be aimed at delivering the 
minimum. What is therefore the minimum that should be required by the international 
standards? 
 What is the value of simplified identification and verification processes if standard 
processes are not able to reliably identify honest as well as criminal clients? 
 Is it sufficient if a client is not identified upfront, but is identifiable or can be tracked 
and located? 
 What does “identify” mean in a high technology, low-capacity context and when 
would a client cross the line between “identified” and “anonymous”? 
 What is meant by “reliable, independent source documents, data or information” in a 
low-capacity country that lacks a reliable and comprehensive national identity scheme 
or commercial information covering the majority of the population? 
 How should simplified CDD or anonymous products be reconciled with international 
obligations to deny financial services to listed terrorists or should the FATF press for 
an exclusion of low-risk products and transactions from the international sanctions 
scheme? 
3.6.3 What are the advantages and disadvantages of a tiered CDD scheme? 
A tiered or progressive CDD scheme subjects clients accessing basic, low-risk products to no 
or very little CDD but requires higher levels of due diligence in respect of more 
comprehensive, higher risk products. Clients who wish to access only basic products are 
therefore not confronted by access barriers that may be posed by higher levels of CDD. 
Implicit in the discussion of tiered CDD is a suggestion that customers who access basic 
products are able to improve their formal standing and will be in a stronger position to meet 
higher due diligence requirements when they need to migrate to more complex products. 
The success of a tiered CDD scheme depends of course on the design of the scheme as well 
as the products, for example: 
 If the basic product is too basic, it may not meet the market demands. 
 The CDD requirements must be informed by the ability of clients for those products 
to meet the requirements. Clients for basic products may not be able to meet even 
simplified CDD requirements. 
 The tiers and requirements must be set appropriately. If requirements are too simple 
(or none are imposed) or simplified measures are applied to an overly broad range of 
products, AML/CFT will be undermined. 
A potential disadvantage of a tiered CDD system is that it locks clients into basic products, if 
they are not able to meet higher levels of CDD requirements. Experience has shown that the 
financially excluded has a range of financial needs. Simplified CDD may assist financially 
excluded persons to gain a foothold within formal financial services but they will still face 
CDD barriers when they need to expand their range of products or need to transact outside 
the parameters imposed on the basic products. Product restrictions also impact on the 
attractiveness of the product from both a service provider and a client perspective [28]. 
3.6.4 What do effective KYA measures entail in relation to small, informal retailers? 
Branchless banking models rely on non-bank businesses, such as small retailers, to provide 
cash-in and cash-out services in remote and rural areas. These retailers are customer contact 
points and in some models even perform account-opening functions. Such retailers pose 
AML/CFT risks that must be mitigated. One basic measure is to require service providers to 
perform due diligence measures on such retailers. This is referred to as Agent Due Diligence 
or KYA measures even though the retailers may not be strictly acting as agents of the service 
provider. 
Standard KYA measures would often involve ensuring that the business is properly 
registered, verifying the business address, identifying the beneficial owner of the business, 
performing appropriate background checks on the beneficial owner and in general ensuring 
that the business is able to comply with its legal and contractual obligations (FATF, 2009, pp. 
38-40). 
In many developing countries, the retailers are primarily small, informal shops with very 
limited accounting records, if any. The proprietors of these shops will often face the same 
identity verification challenges that are faced by the financially excluded members of their 
society. The actual KYA processes that can be performed in respect of such businesses in 
low-capacity countries are often quite limited. The business premises would be visited by 
representative but background checks, if any, will be rudimentary and fairly informal. Such 
processes would, for instance, not necessarily deliver assurance that the retailer is not linked 
to organised crime. Thought should therefore be given to the circumstances under which 
KYA would be required and what such processes should entail. KYA processes in cases 
where little value can be derived, will add costs to the system without addressing integrity 
concerns. 
3.6.5 What is the value of transaction monitoring in relation to basic financial products 
that are offered anonymously or in terms of a simplified CDD scheme? 
It is often argued that the risk introduced by simplified CDD can be mitigated by closely 
monitoring transactions linked to the relevant products and accounts. 
Monitoring refers to manual or electronic scanning of transactions to identify outliers. 
Scanning uses parameters such as the country of origin or destination of the transaction, the 
value of the transaction and its nature. Client and beneficiary names are also used and these 
are scanned against national and international sanctions lists. The scanning process may flag 
a number of transactions for internal investigation. A client's name may be identical to a 
name on a sanctions list, but a brief internal investigation may show that the client is not the 
person who is listed. Transactions with values that exceed the normal value for that type of 
transaction, are often also flagged for internal investigation. 
Monitoring and internal investigation requires capacity and, depending on the method of 
monitoring, may be time consuming and expensive. If an outlier transaction is identified, it 
must be investigated internally. The mere fact that a transaction does not fit the profile of the 
client does not render it suspicious and reportable. Additional facts must be gathered and 
considered. The investigator will typically require more information about the client and the 
transaction before a reasonable conclusion can be drawn that the transaction is innocent or 
that there are reasonable grounds to suspect that the transaction involves ML/FT. The 
investigation is complicated by the fact that tipping-off provisions bar investigators from 
contacting clients to obtain more information. 
Depending on the level of CDD, effective monitoring in respect of basic account-based 
financial inclusion products may challenging: If the product is anonymous or very little CDD 
is undertaken, the monitoring process may not be able to deliver significant benefits. 
Monitoring systems will identify a range of outlier transactions that may or may not be 
suspicious. How should such transactions be investigated effectively to determine whether 
there are reasonable grounds to file a report with the Financial Intelligence Unit? The 
transaction values are generally low because the amount that may be transacted through that 
product is capped at a low value. If an outlier transaction is identified, it still involves a 
modest sum of money. It is therefore pragmatic to consider how much should be spent on 
initial internal investigation of low-value transactions that were flagged, especially if the 
internal investigators are not able to rely on comprehensive and reliable CDD information? 
Relevant information may be found, but investigations will require resources and the majority 
of flagged transactions will often not be reportable once the facts were established. 
These questions are also relevant to public authorities. Once a report on a low-value 
transaction is filed with the Financial Intelligence Unit, how much time, effort and money 
will the authorities spend on investigating that report? This is particularly relevant in relation 
to mobile money where the client and the retailer may be in a remote, rural area far from the 
unit and often also far from a police office with capacity to investigate ML/FT. When 
answering this question it is also relevant to consider what the practical steps are that 
investigators can take to investigate such a report. 
3.6.6 How do you prove or demonstrate that unproven new products are low-risk products? 
The definition of “financial institution” in the glossary to the 40 Recommendations states 
that: 
In strictly limited and justified circumstances, and based on a proven low risk of money 
laundering, a country may decide not to apply some or all of the Forty Recommendations to 
some of the financial activities stated above. 
In the FATF's The Review of the Standards – Preparation for the 4th Round of Mutual 
Evaluations 2010, the principle is stated somewhat broader (p. 4): 
Where there is proven low ML/TF risk, and in strictly limited and justified circumstances, a 
country may exempt financial institutions or DNFBPs from applying certain FATF 
Recommendations. 
This broader statement is in accordance with the general message that the FATF has given in 
relation to low-risk products. If countries can prove or demonstrate that there is low risk of 
ML/FT, some exemptions from standard obligations may be justified. These exemptions are 
therefore crucial to a financial inclusion framework. However, the requirement that low risk 
must be proved or demonstrated is problematic in respect of new products and services such 
as mobile money. The language creates a regulatory deadlock: proof and demonstration 
requires evidence and evidence can only be generated by launching and testing the product. 
Yet, the product cannot be launched without a facilitative regulatory framework that can only 
be shaped within the context of the low-risk exception and exemptions. 
When the text of the FATF Recommendations and interpretative notes are amended, it would 
be helpful if the word “proven” is not used in this context. Language supports a thorough and 
objective risk assessment and a reasonable and justifiable conclusion about the risk profile of 
a product will be more appropriate to financial inclusion products than language requiring 
proof and demonstration. 
3.6.7 What are appropriate controls for financial inclusion products that cannot be rated 
as low risk, but moves users from high-risk informal transactions to formal and more 
controlled financial services? 
Financial inclusion products can move clients from high-risk informal cash-based 
transactions to formal, regulated financial services. Such a shift will improve the overall 
ML/FT risk profile of the country and its economy. However, in some countries, effective 
financial inclusion products may not necessarily pose a low ML/FT risk. The risk profile of 
the products may actually be fairly high given the nature of the economy and the level of 
crime. However, they may still pose a lower risk than informal, cash-based transactions. 
It would seem sensible to enable such a country to support a simplified regulatory regime for 
financial inclusion products (De Koker, 2009b). In these cases, simplified CDD will not be 
justifiable given the profile of the product but will be justified given its impact on informal 
financial services. If the FATF supports such employment of such products, it will need to 
adopt clear language expressing such support. It will need to signal that simplified CDD may 
be justifiable in these cases, even though the risk level of the products would normal dictate 
more stringent controls. The FATF would also need to consider appropriate principles to 
ensure that this exception is not abused by countries. 
3.6.8 Should AML/CFT measures in relation to financial inclusion products be concerned 
with PEPs? 
FATF's Recommendation 6 requires all financial institutions to take specific measures to 
determine whether a potential client is a PEP and, if so, to mitigate the risks of handling 
proceeds of corruption. PEP provisions extend to close business associates and family 
members. While the vast majority of PEPs may be wealthy and banked, not all persons 
falling within the definition are. In many developing countries, persons who may be subject 
to PEP controls may also be potential clients for financial inclusion products. Should the 
FATF expressly exclude small providers of financial inclusion services and products in 
general from the PEP measures? These measures are expensive and create a significant 
compliance burden for small financial inclusion service providers and products. An 
exclusion, on the other hand, may undermine PEP measures and combating of corruption in 
general in those developing countries where low value corruption is systemic. 
3.6.9 Should the FATF refer to specific minimum amounts in its standards? 
The FATF lists various amounts in the interpretative notes to the standards, for instance, 
designated thresholds and maximum amounts for some examples of low-risk transactions and 
products. On the one hand, it may be attractive to state amounts in international currency to 
ensure a standard level of global compliance. On the other hand, such an approach does not 
necessarily ensure equivalent results in countries around the globe (De Koker, 2009b). The 
amounts that are listed are often too low for developed countries or too high for developing 
countries. If amounts are too low, the compliance burden will be onerous and financial 
inclusion will be undermined. Amounts that are too high, may undermine AML/CFT. 
4 Towards solutions 
If the FATF addresses the questions set out above, it will be in a stronger position to provide 
guidance regarding the alignment of financial inclusion and AML/CFT. It may be difficult to 
get consensus about some of the answers, but it is important to pursue consensus because that 
will determine the level of clarity and consistency of its financial inclusion and integrity 
guidance. 
Guidance that fails to provide certainty relating to AML/CFT and financial inclusion 
products, will continue to disrupt the design of appropriate regulatory frameworks. 
Challenging though the task may be, the FATF should do its utmost to clarify its views. 
Governments and regulators in developing countries feel very exposed to FATF mutual 
evaluations of compliance. If they do not feel comfortable that proposed regulatory 
frameworks for financial inclusion programs will meet FATF standards, they will be hesitant 
to endorse them. This hesitation will continue to retard financial inclusion developments. It is 
therefore important that the FATF considers its position from the viewpoint of these 
policymakers and regulators. The text of the FATF Recommendations read with the 
interpretative notes, guidance notes as well as the mutual evaluation methodology, must 
provide them with the required level of confidence. 
It is submitted that the FATF should clarify its conceptual thinking and illustrate it with 
examples. The current approach in the 2003 FATF texts and risk-based guidance papers is to 
list some examples and indicators of risk but to leave it to the reader to construct the 
underlying concepts of risk. This approach raises more questions than it answers. Ideally, the 
FATF should, at the very least: 
 define “risk” for purposes of the risk-based approach; 
 define what it means by “high/er risk” and “low/er risk” and how these concepts 
should be applied in relation to ML and FT; 
 indicate whether it has a tolerance level for risk, and if so, what that level is. Should 
AML/CFT systems try to identify all dirty transactions irrespective of size – as was 
often implied when the CFT measures were first introduced – or has it been accepted 
that the main focus is on larger flows of money? and 
 ensure alignment between its simplified CDD guidance and the international CFT 
sanctions regime. 
Once the principles are defined, they can be illustrated by examples. However, unless the 
principles are clearly defined, lists of potential examples of low or lower risk, for instance, 
examples of products that “may” or “could” be classified as low risk “depending on the 
context” are not particularly helpful. Without conceptual clarity, a regulator will still not be 
able to determine whether the particular version of the example in its jurisdiction will be one 
that meets the requirements of a “low-risk” qualification. 
Country examples are helpful but they need to be contextualized. If a particular country's 
regulation is cited, it is important to outline why that country's approach is regarded as 
successful and compliant with the FATF standards. How does that country succeed in 
balancing financial inclusion and AML/CFT? What is the level of risk that the approach 
allows? How did they country determine that level of risk and how does it monitor and 
manage that risk? 
It is also important to be realistic about achievable outcomes. 
The FATF sets international standards and cannot be expected to be overly explicit on details 
(De Koker, 2009b). Neither can it be radical or have short-term outlook. Countries need to 
amend their laws and institutions their practices to comply with any amendments. These 
changes are expensive and can take years to implement. The FATF must therefore be 
forward-looking and in this regard there are a number of matters that would exercise their 
minds, for example: 
 Will they need to change tack in foreseeable future? One of the complications is that 
products and services that currently pose a low risk, may have a different risk profile 
in future. Low-risk products that are subjected to simplified controls, attract criminal 
attention. They may be more difficult or cumbersome to abuse, but the lower level of 
controls render them more attractive to abuse. Perversely the “low-risk” designation 
alerts criminals to the potential for abuse and invites them to design schemes that can 
exploit the absence of comprehensive controls. There is evidence that organized crime 
is laundering money in increasingly smaller amounts[29]. Will FATF need to revisit 
financial inclusion products in the near future because levels of abuse will be of 
concern? Users of financial inclusion products will constitute a significant group in all 
countries and in many countries may in a relatively short time comprise the majority 
of the users of formal financial services. Clients in these countries that are subject to 
simplified CDD measures will therefore outnumber clients who are subject to 
standard CDD measures. That result is justifiable within a risk-based approach, but 
may require FATF members to undergo a mind shift. 
 How is the new approach aligned with CFT? CFT focused the attention of FATF on 
low-value transactions. The revision may require the FATF to take a more pragmatic 
view of what is practical and achievable in respect of mass market low-value 
transactions and may require the FATF to also engage the United Nations on the 
general CFT strategy (Counter-Terrorism Working Group, 2009). If the global CFT 
focus on low-value transactions is retained, CFT will continue to undermine financial 
inclusion, especially in a number of developing countries with terror financing risk. 
This focus will therefore deny such countries the social benefits – and longer term 
economic benefits and potential for increased political stability – that are associated 
with financial inclusion. A CFT focus on low-value transactions therefore has the 
tendency to undermine the potential of financial inclusion to address poverty and 
social concerns, which may be key drivers of support for terrorism. The concept of 
“low” CFT risk also needs to be clarified. How should that level of risk be measured 
and what are the levels that can be tolerated and described as “low” or even 
“standard”?[30] 
Financial inclusion experts also need to be realistic regarding the impact of any amendments 
that the FATF may make: 
 Amendments to the FATF standards will not immediately translate into relaxed 
practices by financial institutions. The FATF amendments will take some time before 
they are reflected by national laws and regulations. Even when that happens, some 
institutions may decide to “overcomply” with CDD obligations by electing not to 
implement simplified measures to the extent allowed by national laws. Overcompliant 
behaviour is driven by various factors[31]. For example, the FATF requirements are 
not the only set of international CDD requirements. The Basel Committee on Banking 
Supervision issued guidance on CDD in 2001 (Basel Committee on Banking 
Supervision, 2001). This guidance reflects conservative banking practices and 
influence compliance mindsets of banking regulators and banks. Fraud is also a 
significant driver of stringent client identification and verification. Although 
institutions may be allowed to employ less stringent CDD, they will generally elect 
not to, where it exposes them to fraud risk and loss[32]. The requirements of national 
and international sanctions laws and schemes, including those relating to CFT, will 
continue to inform a more conservative approach[33]. 
 If amendments are made to the FATF framework, but these fail to clarify how 
simplified CDD may be employed in relation to financial inclusion products, it may 
take years before some regulators in low-capacity countries will be willing to adopt 
such measures. They will wait for a measure of clarity to emerge from reports 
produced during the fourth round of mutual evaluations before they will be confident 
to endorse a simplified CDD regime. 
The debate regarding appropriate alignment of AML/CFT and financial inclusion goals also 
requires input from civil society. All AML/CFT stakeholders should be sensitive to the 
potential consequences of aligned processes. AML/CFT controls place personal information 
of clients in the hands of financial institutions where they can be accessed by governments, 
depending on national legal conditions that may apply. Clients in countries that are subject to 
the rule of law can rely on constitutional and other legal protection. The FATF footprint – 
and compliance pressure – extends, however, to countries that do not have appropriate 
protection for civil liberties and especially for client privacy. Those targeted by financial 
inclusion initiatives are often vulnerable members of society. The complementarity argument 
enables countries to harness market forces to bring vulnerable communities into a formal and 
more transparent financial framework. It is submitted that society should be concerned about 
appropriate protection of new users of financial services and this concern should extend 
further than the general concept of consumer protection. 
Civil society should, for example, question whether the FATF framework has appropriate 
controls to ensure that law enforcement objectives are balanced with an appropriate emphasis 
on human rights and especially privacy protection. The exposure of new, vulnerable financial 
services clients to breaches of international human rights standards by oppressive regimes 
acting ostensibly in furtherance of AML/CFT and financial inclusion, would be 
unconscionable. 
In this debate, it should also be considered whether the interests of socially vulnerable 
persons are appropriately served by simplifying CDD requirements. Would their long-term 
interests and those of society not best be served by supporting the development of national 
identification and legal frameworks that would enable all residents to prove their identity 
with ease, while balancing their right to privacy with the need for reasonable and justifiable 
transparency? 
Notes 
1. This has been the subject of discussion at various rounds of the Cambridge 
International Symposium on Economic Crime since the 1990s. See also the calls for 
FATF sensitivity for developing country requirements in Bester et al. (2008) and De 
Koker (2006). 
2. I expressed my personal views on some of the key matters in a series of articles and 
papers that I reference in this paper. 
3. I refrained from repeating questions that have already been put to the FATF in public 
documents such as FATF (2010b, pp. 66-71). 
4. Higher levels of financial inclusion in Kenya are, for example, accompanied by 
increased levels of fraud and misappropriation (Business Daily, 2010). 
5. For interesting perspectives on some negative experiences of Mzansi clients in South 
Africa, see Bankable Frontier Associates (2009, pp. 115-18, 127). 
6. For a limited study of experiences and perceptions relating to some products in a 
country context, see De Koker (2009c). 
7. Some countries, for example, have data regarding the reporting of suspicious 
transactions but it is not clear how the data should be interpreted. A low reporting rate 
relating to financial inclusion products may indicate that these products pose a low 
risk. It may, however, also indicate an inability in the system to identify suspicious 
transactions. 
8. For some of the author's personal answers to these questions, see De Koker (2006, 
2009a, b, c). 
9. This was raised in particular by law enforcement officials on 10 September 2004 at 
the Twenty-first Cambridge International Symposium on Organised Crime during a 
workshop entitled “’Know your customer’ rules and the financially excluded” 
presented by L. de Koker and J. Kaetzler. 
10. Princess Máxima advanced a similar argument in her address to the FATF plenary 
meeting in Amsterdam on 23 June 2010. 
11. According to FinScope Statistics on Tanzania, available at: 
www.finscope.co.za/tanzania.html (accessed 20 November 2010). 
12. See De Koker, 2006. See also FATF, 2010b, para. 39: “The first feature that money 
launderers and terrorist financiers abuse prevalently is cash and bearer negotiable 
instruments. The summary of the 2009 Strategic Surveillance exercise indicated that a 
noteworthy proportion of ML/TF activity continues to involve cash. The use of cash 
or currency (i.e. banknotes and coins used as a medium of exchange) is attractive to 
criminals mainly because of its anonymity and lack of audit trail. Criminals look for 
as much flexibility as possible and are interested in avoiding detection. Cash provides 
that flexibility, as it is universally accepted and can be used and moved with little or 
no record keeping”). See also para. 57 on financial inclusion as a means to mitigate 
cash risks. 
13. For instance, Recommendation 20 on more secure money management, SR IX on 
alternative remittance and SR IX on cash couriers. 
14. The article states amongst others: “Gangsters, drug dealers and money launderers 
appear to be playing their part in helping shore up the financial stability of the euro 
zone. That's thanks to their demand, according to European authorities, for high-
denomination euro bank notes, in particular the 200 and 500 bills. The European 
Central Bank issues these notes for a hefty profit that is welcome at a time when its 
response to the financial crisis has called its financial strength into question. The high-
value bills are increasingly ‘making the euro the currency of choice for underground 
and black economies, and for all those who value anonymity in their financial 
transactions and investments,’ wrote Willem Buiter, chief economist at Citigroup, in a 
recent research report. The business of issuing euro notes, produced at almost zero 
cost, is ‘wildly profitable’ for the ECB, Mr Buiter wrote” (Wall Street Journal, 2010). 
15. In May 2010, grave concerns about the criminal abuse of the EUR 500 led to a ban a 
UK ban on banks and bureaux de change from giving out EUR 500 notes to 
customers (Miami Herald, 2010). 
16. Bester et al. (2008, p. 39) therefore advises countries to, amongst others, promote 
market-based reforms to facilitate formalisation and to develop identification 
infrastructure. 
17. This is, for example, advocated in Bester et al. (2008) and Isern and de Koker (2009). 
18. Software vendors may argue to the contrary and may point to the high number of 
flagged transactions and a low number of “false” positives (innocent transactions that 
were incorrectly flagged for investigation) as evidence of the effectiveness of their 
systems. However, we lack reliable data on the number of transactions that involve 
proceeds of crime that are not detected by the monitoring systems. Given the large 
amounts of proceeds of crime that are allegedly swirling about in the world economy, 
the number of undetected transactions appears high. For data challenges in this 
context, see Demetis (2009). 
19. Simplification will not have this effect where the simplified processes merely 
dispense with requirements that were superfluous to the standard processes. The 
South African Exemption 17 simplified processes could dispense with address 
verification as this served little purpose in the standard requirements (De Koker, 
2004). 
20. CDD should be undertaken when there is cause for suspicion but this does not amount 
to much in practice: When CDD is not undertaken as a standard measure, institutions 
have far less cause for suspicion and therefore CDD measures are less likely to be 
triggered. 
21. Directive 2005/60/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 October 
2005 on the Prevention of the Use of the Financial System for the Purpose of Money 
Laundering and Terrorist Financing, article 5(d), available at: http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2005:309:0015:0036:EN:PDF 
(accessed 13 November 2010). 
22. In respect of risk toleration, see De Koker (2009b). 
23. Regarding verification and whether it is optional or not, see De Koker, 2009a. 
24. For a valuable discussion of the bases for formal human identification, see Clarke 
(1994). 
25. For broader perspectives on CDD processes and their functions, see Maurer (2005). 
26. For a more comprehensive discussion, see De Koker (2009a). 
27. A client who purchases items from a supermarket is normally not subjected to 
identification processes and would be rated as “anonymous”. Yet, the customer may 
be paying by credit card, may swipe a pre-registered store loyalty card or may have 
his image captured on the store's security camera. This means that information is 
available that will enable the identification of that client by law enforcement, should 
that be required. The client may therefore not have been identified prior to the 
transaction, but is reasonably identifiable, should there be a need to identify the client. 
28. See the brief discussion in para. 1 above. 
29. See in relation to “micro-structuring”, Isern and de Koker, 2009. 
30. A possible solution lies in a careful repositioning of the arguments regarding the 
impact of the FATF's CDD measures on the FT, for instance, that these measures 
impact on larger flows of funds to terrorists and their organizations and, while 
reasonable steps are taken to safeguard smaller transactions against abuse, where 
feasible, CDD measures are not primarily focused on those (De Koker, 2009b, p. 
345). 
31. For an analysis of drivers of overcompliant behaviour, see De Koker and Symington 
(2011). 
32. Good corporate governance principles require appropriate risk managements systems 
that also address fraud risk and the reputational damage that the institution may suffer 
if it facilitates ML or FT, even unwittingly. 
33. Policymakers who wish to see financial institutions implementing simplified CDD 
should not only amend national AML/CFT laws and regulations but also any other 
law (statutory or common law) that may compel institutions to identify and verify the 
identities of their clients. They will also need to identify and counter the impact of any 
foreign laws that may have an extraterritorial impact in relation to simplified CDD 
practices. In addition, they will need to address business concerns regarding fraud risk 
and reputational risk that the institution may face if clients are not subjected to 
comprehensive CDD. They will also need to address consumer protection risks that 
may be linked to simplified CDD as these may undermine the relevant business 
models. 
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